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ABSTRACT
The development of new intelligent agents requires an interdisciplinary approach to pro
gramming. The initial challenge is to describe the desired agent behaviors and abilities without
necessarily committing the agent development project to one particular programming language.
What are the appropriate linguistic and logical tools for creating a top level, unambiguous,
program-independent, and consistent description of the functions and behaviors of the agent?
And how can that description then be translated easily into one of a number of program lan
guages? This article provides a case study of the application of a simple Belief, Desire, and
Intention (EDI) first order logic to a complex set of agent functions of a theoretical community
of intelligent nano-spacecraft. The basic research was conducted at NASA-GSFC (Greenbelt),
Advanced Architecture Branch, during the summer of 2001. The simple examples of applied
BDI logic presented here suggest broad application in agent software development.

INTRODUCTION
The demand for intelligent agent software is likely to grow as both public and private sector
innovators seek to deploy adaptive, autonomous, information technologies to production, sched
uling, resource management, office assistance, information collection, remote sensing, and other
complex functions. Intelligent agents, also knows as autonomous agents, are distinguished from
other software programs by their ability to respond to a changing environment in pursuit of goals.
One of the most critical stages of such intelligent agent development is the basic research
that goes into determining how to translate client needs into agent software. Since programmers
and operations managers have different expertise, there is often a linguistic gap between the
functional language of the customer and the technical programming language of the agent devel
oper. If the customer and agent developer do not speak a common language, both time and money
may be lost in needless errors and misunderstandings.
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There is a need for a program-independent, unambiguous, logically consistent language for
describing the desired computer agent practical reasoning abilities and behaviors. Program inde
pendence gives the customer maximum flexibility in choosing a programming language to imple
ment the desired functions. The avoidance of ambiguity allows the customer to say exactly what
she means. And logical consistency ensures that only valid arguments will be generated by the
agent's knowledge base, avoiding false beliefs about the world from being deduced from true
beliefs.
A program independent language for describing agent functions, practical reasoning, and
behaviors, solves what may be called the top-level description problem. The top level of descrip
tion should be close enough to ordinary English to be interdisciplinary, yet rigorous enough to
avoid ambiguity and inconsistency. The strategy of solving this problem borrows from first order
logic, cognitive science and recent work in the field of artificial intelligence, specifically autono
mous agent theory (see, e.g., the collection of articles in Muller, Wooldridge, & Jennings, 1997).
The solution to the top level description problem suggested by some of the recent autono
mous agent research is to combine the practical reasoning tools developed by psychologist Michael
Bratman's belief, desire, and intention (BDI) framework (1987), with some of the tools of first
order logic. This hybrid language is usually referred to as BDI logic. There are a number of BDI
logics under development; here we employ the Logic of Rational Agents (LORA) developed by
Michael Wooldridge (2000) to illustrate how BDI logic works in practice.
The authors faced the top-level description problem at NASA during the basic research
stage of specifying the behaviors of a community of agents, in this case, the Autonomous NanoTechnology Swarm (ANTS).' ANTS will be designed to engage in practical reasoning and behav
iors that implement the variety of functions necessary to explore the asteroid belt and communi
cate observations to earth.

' The ANTS concept is indebted to the work of Mark Campbell, et al. (05/31/99) in "Intelligent Satellite Teams for Space
Systems." As an example of an Intelligent Satellite Team (1ST), the report considered "a large number of satellites orbiting the Sun using
optical and infrared sensors to look for asteroids" (p. 7). These satellites would share data, track, and collect information about interest
ing asteroids. The report mentions the important role of practical reasoning in 1ST: "Reasoning in an agent allows the agent to reach an
intelligent conclusion or decision about a given set of data" (p. 31). The report notes that this practical reasoning would give the agent
more adaptability and autonomy. But there is no attempt to develop a top-level language for describing this type of reasoning.
In another foundational paper. Steven Curtis, et al. (2(XX)) provides a description of the mission, system architectures, and ANT
functions, including the type of instruments ANTS will employ to collect data bout asteroids. Thereare alsodescriptions of how ANTS
might coordinate their functions. The operational scenarios, however, do not attempt to represent the state of knowledge of each ANT.
and therefore do not reveal the anatomy of practical reasoning. Again, a language of ANT practical reasoning would be required tocarry
out such an objective.
Turszkowski, Zoch, and Smith (2000) point out that a subsystem agent must be able to exercise some "reasoning process" in
order to make use of external resources in new ways (p. 6). The first stage in realizing spacecraft constellation autonomy is "agent
development." We suggest that tfiis stage requires an economic way to describe practical reasoning of the agents.
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METHODOLOGY
The first methodological consideration is to deujrmine the level of detail that is appropriate
in applying LORA as an agent development tool. The purpose of using BDI logic here is not to
prove theorems; a sufficient body of deductive proofs has already been developed in first order
logic textbooks. Nor is it to impress the client with obtuse descriptions of functions. It is rather to
use just enough symbolism to economize the clarify the practical reasoning of the agents.
The second methodological consideration is to announce our position on exactly what we
mean to imply when employing psychological terms to describe computer agents. In what John
Searle calls strong AI, conscious experience is attributed to intelligent computer agents (1984).
In this paper we remain agnostic with regard to the debate over whether computer agents have
real as opposed to "as if intentionality (see Mills, 1998a; 1998b, for a detailed discussion). We
discuss only those features of the debate that elucidate the advantages of using BDI logic as
opposed to engineering or design idioms for top-level descriptions of communities of agents.
Part one of this paper provides theoretical justitication for the use of Bratman's BDI frame
work for understanding agent behaviors. Part two provides an explanation of how first order
logic can be combined with BDI and a dynamic component to account for agent decisions in time.
Part three presents a practical problem of describing the behavior of a community of agents
involved in a very complex scientific endeavor, in this case, the ANTS exploration of the asteroid
belt. We believe the insights presented here have practical implications for the large variety of
agents that will be developed in the near future.

PART I. BRATMAN'S BDI FRAMEWORK: THE INTENTIONAL STANCE
The intentional stance treats a sufficiently complex system as if it had mental states and
engaged in practical reasoning. The term "intentionality," first used in empirical psychology by
Franz Brentano (1973/1874), means directness towards an object. As John Searle points out
(1984), one of the unique features of mental states is that they are always directed towards or
about some object. If I perceive, I perceive something. If I believe, I believe that something is the
case. If I intend something, I have some purpose in mind. We often use the intentional stance
towards artifacts also, as when we say the car does not want to start. But we do not really believe
that a car has desires; we speak only of the car "as if it had desires to avoid a mechanical
description of what is going on when it fails to start.
Regardless of where one stands in the philosophical debate regarding whether more com
plex machines such as computer agents have real or just "as if intentionality, both sides gener
ally agree that the intentional stance is an economic way to describe a complex system that
engages in practical reasoning. Daniel Dennett (1978) points out that this economy of expression
becomes clear when we contrast the intentional stEince with the engineering stance. ANTS pro
vides a good example of the economy of expression that results from opuug for the intentional
stance for top-level descriptions of agent behaviors.
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Imagine a community of nano-spacecraft setting out to explore the asteroid belt. At some
point in the deployment of this community, ANT #24 determines some activity is a priority and
desires to execute that activity. At the programming level of description one would need to know
the semantics and syntax of the programming language and read the code. At the even more
detailed engineering level, one would then translate this higher level code into the impossibly
complex machine code.
By contrast, if one employs the intentional stance, the practical reasoning of Agent #24
becomes simple and concise; "Agent #24 desires to observe Asteroid Psyche, believes that the
conditions are now optimal for such observation, and thus intends to make such observations."
The next step is to imbed this intentional language in a first order logic to ensure the consistency
of all descriptions of the ANTS behaviors.

PART II. COMBINING DBI WITH FIRST ORDER LOGIC AND DYNAMICS
First Order Loeic
First order logic contains simple symbolic rules for combining propositions. For example,
"Anna is a student and Anna is a biology major" can be represented by conjunction: p q. First
order logic provides a generally accepted consistent logic. It is ideal for stating combinations and
relations between beliefs, desires, and intentions about the world. It allows us to state just what
the system knows without having to account for what it does not yet know (see Levesque &
Lakemeyer, 2000, for a discussion).
In order to represent the knowledge of the agent, some initial set of beliefs about the world
are formulated. The inference of rules of first order logic are used to ensure that the beliefs are
consistent and that arguments are always valid. By following the basic rules of first order logic,
new beliefs can be deduced from the current set of beliefs and acquired beliefs. (These acquired
beliefs are based, e.g., on new inputs from the environment.)
In the case of ANTS, the initial beliefs are about known asteroid types, relative locations,
shapes, rotations, mass, distribution, gravity, albedo and in some cases provisional classifica
tions of asteroids (P. E. Clark, ANTS 04/05/01). The inputs will originate in sensor instrument
data and communications data.
Example in ANTS Knowledee Base
An example of a representation in the ANTS knowledge base using some simplified LORA
is:
•
•
•
•

(differentiated Psyche v (undiff) Psyche
(differentiated Psyche => (PriorityObject) Psyche
(differentiated)Psyche {new knowledge!}
(5000MIFRAnt#24) Psyche

[either,or]
[if, then]
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Notice that first order logic is used here, without BDI, to represent the truism that asteroid
Psyche is either differentiated or undifferentiated. If it is differentiated, it becomes a priority
object of investigation that could trigger other actions. Assume that sensor information confirms
that Psyche is differentiated. It then follows necessiuily that Psyche becomes a priority object.
The last formula states that ANT #24 is in the proximity of Psyche. We can expect that, given the
right combination of BDI, #24 will set as a goal the closer observation of Psyche and finally
actuate behaviors towards the attainment of the goal.
In order to begin the construction of a language that includes practical reasoning, Wooldridge
adds a Belief component to represent epistemic states (2000). Thus we refine our description of
ANT #24's knowledge by adding:
(Bel q PriorityObject(Psyche))
Here, agent #24 (represented by the symbol "q") believes that psyche is a priority object.
This belief can be updated or modified given additional information from the sensors or new
communications.
In order to complete Bratman's framework for practical reasoning, we now add the inten
tional and emotive components: intentions and desires. Consider a desire as an enduring goal. An
agent may have a number of desires, only some of which are realizable at any given time. An
intention is a pro-attitude. That is, it is a movement toward an immediate objective until that
objective is fulfilled or some new event changes the current intention (Wooldridge, 2000). This
distinction between intentions and desires helps us to explain how an agent may change course in
response to environmental variables that change through time. Here is an example of epistemic
and emotive states combined, using LORA:
•

(Des ruler (Bel worker#24 PriorityObject (Psyche)))

Here the ruler agent desires that ANT #24 believes that psyche is a priority object. This
mental state is important because it may trigger an action by ANT#24, which has among its
desires a desire to pursue priorities set by the ruler ANT.
Dynamic (Temporal) Component
Now that first order logic and BDI have been combined there is one more critical step
required to complete a top-level description of autonomous agency: dynamics. In order to repre
sent practical reasoning and resulting behaviors through time, a schema of relevant features of
the present state of affairs is constructed. Since not every feature of the universe can be repre
sented, the state of affairs, that is, the world of the agent, contains beliefs about only those
features of the universe relevant to the functions of the agent. Since some agent technologies will
be able to learn from their experience, in some architecture the relevant states of affairs can
expand and change. For the present purpose humans will define the relevant state of affairs. Each
node in the schema will branch out into possible worlds. These possible worlds are alternative
paths that the agent may select, depending on its current beliefs, desires, and intentions. The
following map illustrates a world time schema:
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THE WORLD OF ANT
Each world/time state has a number of
possible futures, a = transition actions

w,t = world,time; p,q,r,s,t are beliefs; a = transition action; branches represent possible worlds
(see Wooldridge, 2000 for a more detailed description of agent behaviors through time; the above
chart is adapted from pp. 56, 64, 94)

Specification of Functions
We are not ready to specify the functions of various agents in the community of agents and
then apply LORA to describe their behaviors.
i*-

General ANT community functions
• mapping and close-up imaging of Asteroids using multi-spectral band coverage
[Clark, Memo 04/05/01]
Worker ANT functions
• Communications, resource management, navigation, local status (housekeeping), local
conflict resolutions, science data acquisition processing [Curtis et al., 2000, 3]
Ruler ANT functions
• Plan assignments for worker ANTS
• Maintain shared SWARM statistics
• Resource management [see S. Curtis, et al., 2000, 3]

The ANTS is conceptualized here as a community of autonomous rational agents whose
behaviors are generated by a knowledge base (KB), a set of goals, inference procedures, and
percepts. Although each worker ANT is autonomous in terms of its own function, it is subordi
nate to the function of the ruler. The intentions of the ruler are passed on to the workers through
the messengers and the workers actuate the plans that achieve the goal.
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Each worker has as its permanent goal the appropriate and timely collection or discovery of
data from the target type of objects, the maintenance of health and safety, and the timely commu
nication of data to the messengers, who in turn report to the ruler and to earth. The workers' goals
are sub-goals of the ruler's goal and the worker's plan at any given state of affairs is a sub-plan of
the ruler's plan.
Example of a LORA Specification
In the scenario, the Ruler has received information about an opportunity to view Psyche
under ideal conditions and there is a group of worker ,ants in the neighborhood of Asteroid Psyche
(A).
The Ruler forms an intention to attain a goal as a result of a deduction that employs beliefs
in its KB, acquired beliefs derived from current percepts, and its belief derived from communica
tions with all ANTS. There is a potential for a group of workers and allied messengers to achieve
the goal. This is exactly the sort of scenario supported by BDI type logic!
For simplicity temporal considerations, quantification, proofs, and goal/sub-goal relations
are left out. We seek to illustrate here the usefulness of BDI logic to model the practical reasoning
or "mental states" of cooperating agents.
A = constant for Psyche
PfC = perception of the potential for cooperation
i = ruler agent
j = messenger agent
g = group of worker agents, each with specialized observation instruments
a = action
(p = goal to study Asteroid Psyche
achvs = attain through an action
Bel = Belief
Des = Desire
n = Set of plans to be actuated (executed) by each vi'orker to attain cp
tp = Preconditions for cp to become the next goal (Science agenda from humans, combination of
percepts in relation to KB)
J-attempt = joint attempt
Assumption: The Ruler has formed an intention to achieve the goal of collecting data about
Asteroid Psyche. We do not here represent the deliberations that lead to this intention. We begin
with the process of mobilizing the workers to achieve the goal and a description of the mental
state of the community of agents.
The Ruler forms an intention to attain a goal (to study Psyche) as a result of (p having been
met. (p, in this case, is a combination of the ruler's KB, mission priorities, current percepts, its
belief that the goal has not yet been attained, its belief that the ruler itself cannot or does not desire
to achieve the goal by itself, and its belief that there is a potential for a group of workers and
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allied messengers to achieve the goal. The ruler will therefore intend not only the goal, but that the
messenger intends the goal and that the group of workers intends the goal and finally achieves the
goal.
Additional Specifications
(Int i (p)

(PfCi (p) ^ (Int i (Int j (p (Int g (p)))

The ruler intends the goal of studying the Asteroid Psyche and acknowledges the potential for
cooperation among the workers to being about the goal and intends that the messenger intends
that the group of workers intends the goal.
Int i (Achvs g a 7t tp)
The ruler intends that each member of the group following its share of the plan can achieve the
goal through the group's actions.
{Inform i j a Tt cp}

(Request Thi i a (Inform j g a 7t cp}}

Agree j i a'}; a'
Here the a is the informing action and a' is the action that j agrees to perform.
(Inform j g a Jt cp} ^ (Requests Thj g a (Happens a')}
It is assumed that, unless the workers receive percepts, in relation to their KB, that requires that
the goal be reevaluated, the group will believe that it can execute the plan to achieve the goal.
(M-Bel g -1 cp)

(M-Des(Achvs a 7t cp)) ^ (M-Int g (Achvs a; cp?)) = (j-Attempt g a cp)

The advantage of using a language like LORA is that we can always add new functions to
an agent and make agent behaviors depend on previous knowledge (the set of beliefs in KB and
new percepts). We can also add to a list of possible behaviors by adding new beliefs. Most
important, we can very economically describe the behavior of the system at a "high level without
employing a program language.
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